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Abstract

One criticism of the estate tax is that it prevents the owners of family businesses from
passing their enterprises onto their children. The problem is that it may be difficult to pay estate
taxes without liquidating the business. A natural question is why individuals with such concerns
do not purchase enough life insurance to meet their estate tax liabilities. This paper examines
whether and how people use life insurance to deal with the estate tax. We find that, other things
being the same, business owners purchase more life insurance than other individuals. However,
on the margin, their insurance purchases are less responsive to estate tax considerations and they
are less likely to have the wherewithal to meet estate tax liabilities out of liquid assets plus
insurance.

1.

Introduction

The United States estate tax raises little revenue. In 1999, it is projected to generate
about $24 billion from the 49,200 estates that are subject to the tax.1 Nevertheless, the tax
engenders a lot of complaints. Particularly vocal are the owners of family businesses, who
bemoan the fact that estate taxes prevent them from passing their enterprises onto their children.
Thus, for example, one Daisy Crowder, the owner of a small construction company with her
husband, pointed out that they had “plowed the earnings from their business for years into
equipment, building, land and other assets to help expand.” As a result they had little cash or
other liquid wealth and she was fearful that her four children would be forced to sell some or all
of the business to pay the [estate tax] bill when she and her husband died” (Stevenson 1997). A
case that recently made headlines concerned John Senstacke, the owner of the nation’s largest
chain of African-American newspapers. Senstacke and his children all wanted to keep the
business in the family. But when Mr. Senstacke died, his estate’s tax liability was $4 million.
The estate did not have enough cash to pay the bill, and the children feared that parts of the chain
would have to be sold off in order to pay the taxes (Christian 1998, p. D1).
The discussion sometimes becomes quite emotional. The president of the National
Federation of Independent Business argued that because of the estate tax, people who “are
dealing with the death of a loved one [also] have the IRS coming in and trying to rip what’s left
out of the heart of the family” (Stevenson 1997). Surveys of small businesses suggest that these
concerns are widespread. For example, a survey by Travis Research Associates (1995, p. 13)
said that 65 percent of the family business owners interviewed indicated that the federal estate
tax would make survival of the family business significantly more difficult or impossible.

As one considers both the overheated rhetoric and the survey results, a natural question
arises: If the owner of a business is truly concerned that it will be difficult to pay estate taxes
without liquidating the enterprise, then why not purchase enough life insurance to pay for the
taxes? Indeed, a survey conducted by Arthur Andersen (1997) indicated that more than twothirds of family business owners expected life insurance to be the primary source of funds to
cover estate taxes. But the Andersen sample included only firms with annual sales in excess of a
million dollars, and what is true for such large enterprises may not be true for smaller ones:
“smaller businesses don’t generate the surpluses necessary to be socked away in life insurance
policies” (Jenkins 1997, p. A19). Even if a business owner purchases insurance, it may not be
enough to cover the estate tax. After all, the market value of a business is often difficult to
estimate, leading to problems in predicting estate tax liability (Bosland 1963, p. 161). (Of
course, such uncertainty could equally well induce business owners to purchase excessive life
insurance.) Indeed, even individuals who do not own businesses may also want to use life
insurance to help pay for estate tax liability if there are illiquid assets in their estates.
To what extent do people use life insurance to provide the wherewithal to meet estate tax
liabilities? We know of no econometric research aimed at answering this question.2 The purpose
of this paper is to examine whether and how people use life insurance to deal with the estate tax.
We focus particularly on business owners because of the aforementioned concerns that the
illiquid nature of their assets makes the estate tax particularly harmful to them.
In the next section we sketch the analytic underpinnings of our analysis. In the third
section, we discuss the data and present some preliminary evidence. The fourth section
motivates the econometric specification and reports our results. We find that, other things being
the same, business owners purchase more life insurance than other individuals. However, on the
2

margin, their insurance purchases are less responsive to estate tax considerations and they are
less likely to have the wherewithal to meet estate tax liabilities with only liquid assets plus
insurance. The final section provides a summary and conclusions.

2.

Analytic Preliminaries

Our focus is on the incentives to employ life insurance as a means to meet the cash-flow
requirements of the estate tax. To fix ideas, suppose that the business owner has a total wealth of

W consisting of B in business assets and L of liquid assets; W = B + L . The individual obtains
utility both from passing along her wealth (including business assets) in the event of death and
FRQVXPLQJKHUZHDOWKGXULQJOLIH,I LVWKHSUREDELOLW\RIGHDWKWKHJRDOLVWRPD[LPL]H
expected utility:
(1)

(1 - ) U ( W l ) + V ( W d )

where Wl is wealth to be enjoyed if the individual lives and Wd is wealth transferred in the event
of death. The presence of the estate tax raises the possibility that the individual will not be able
to pass along the entire business as part of Wd. Specifically, if the tax liability, T, exceeds liquid
assets, then the estate is forced to liquidate the business in order to meet the tax liability.3
However, by their nature, the business assets are illiquid and have greater value in place than
upon liquidation, requiring the sacrifice of more than a dollar of business value in order to obtain
each dollar for the tax collector.4 Alternatively, the individual could purchase insurance, I, at a
price p to meet the estate tax. In doing so, however, the individual reduces liquid wealth:
(2)

L= L - p I .

Thus,

3

(3)

Wl= B+ L - p I .

While the purchase of insurance decreases Wl, it reduces cash flow constraints associated with
the estate tax. Specifically,
Wd= B + L + I - T -

[T - ( L+ I ) ]

(4)

ZKHUH LVDSRVLWLYHFRQVWDQWWKDWUHIOHFWVWKHSHQDOW\IRUOLTXLGDWLQJEXVLQHVVDVVHWV5 For
VLPSOLFLW\DVVXPHWKDWWKHHVWDWHWD[LVOHYLHGDWDSURSRUWLRQDOUDWH RQDEDVHWKDWHTXDOVWKH
sum of business assets ( B ), liquid assets (L) and insurance (I)
T = [B + L + I ] ,

(5)

so that
W d = B (1 - (1 +

) ) + [ L + (1 - p ) I ] (1 +

) (1 - ) .

(6)

The interior solution to the problem of optimal purchase of insurance is
(1 - ) U ′( W l ) p = V ′( W d ) (1 +

) (1 - ) (1 - p ) .

(7)

Assuming that insurance is priced on an actuarially fair basis (p  DOORZVXVWRUHGXFHWKLV
condition to6
U ′( W l ) = V ′( W d )(1 +

(8)

) (1 - ) .

Intuitively, the left hand side of equation (8) is the utility lost by giving up a dollar to obtain
insurance. This dollar of life insurance generates two benefits, which appear on the right hand
side. The first is simply the transfer of $1 to the beneficiary. The second is the value of relaxing
the cash flow constraint.
In the empirical analysis to follow, we focus on the extent to which insurance is used to
fill the “gap” between tax liability and liquid assets, conditional upon the individual’s net wealth,
health status, the structure of the estate tax, and so forth. In the terms of the simple framework

4

we have developed, we seek to estimate how the individual’s insurance decision changes when
the gap, G (= T − L ) , changes, for fixed values of W  DQG 7RLQWHUSUHWVXFKDFRQFHSWXDO
experiment within our framework, notice that a $1 reduction in liquid assets ( L ) that is offset by
a $1 increase in business assets B leaves the individual’s net wealth and estate tax liability (T)
unchanged, but generates a $1 increase in the gap between tax liability and liquid assets plus
insurance. Thus, our interest is in

∂I
∂I ∂I (1 + ) (1 - ) V" (W d ) [(1 + ) (1 - ) - (1 - (1 + ) )]
≡
=
.
∂G ∂ B ∂ L
U ′′(W l ) p + (1 + )2 (1 - )2 V" (W d ) (1 - p)

(9)

([SUHVVLRQ  LVXQDPELJXRXVO\SRVLWLYHXQGHURXUDVVXPSWLRQWKDW !7
Our discussion has focused on the illiquid nature of business assets. But the same
considerations apply to other illiquid assets, such as housing. Thus, while one might expect
concerns about illiquidity and estate taxes to be most pronounced for owners of small businesses,
they may be present more generally. At the same time, one must stress that it does not seem safe
to assume that people act consistently with simple models of estate tax behavior. As Poterba
(1997, 1998) and others have pointed out, for example, donors do not take full advantage of even
simple estate tax avoidance strategies such as inter vivos transfers.

3.

Data
The basic idea behind our empirical strategy is straightforward. As shown above, to the

extent individuals are concerned that their estates have insufficient liquidity to pay estate taxes,
they will buy insurance to fill the gap. This suggests an empirical specification in which the
amount of insurance demanded is a function of the gap between liquid assets and estate tax
liability, inter alia. Estimating such a model allows us to find the marginal effect of an increase
in the gap on insurance demand. Further, with information on the ownership of business assets,
5

one can determine whether those who own businesses and those who do not behave differently in
this respect. A related but distinct issue is whether insurance and liquid assets are sufficient to
cover the entire estate tax liability. That is, can estate taxes be paid without the heirs having to
sell any illiquid assets?
The starting point for finding an appropriate data set is the observation that the older
segment of the population is particularly likely to be sensitive to estate tax issues. Thus, for our
analysis we pool two nationally representative samples of older persons, the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS) and the Asset and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old Survey
(AHEAD).
The HRS began in 1992 with a random sample of noninstitutionalized men and women
aged 51 to 61 and their families. Respondents outside the age range of 51 to 61 can appear in the
sample only if they are married to an age-eligible respondent. A reinterview will occur every two
years for the next decade. Currently, the HRS has two waves of data available for public use; we
study the 1992 wave. The baseline survey contains 12,652 respondents from 7,607 households,
which includes an oversample of blacks, Hispanics, and residents of the state of Florida. The
sample also includes a set of household and respondent level weights that make it possible to
compute statistics that are representative of the national population of individuals aged 51 to 61.
A more detailed discussion of the HRS can be found in Juster and Suzman (1995).
The AHEAD has 8,223 noninstitutionalized respondents aged 70 and older from 6,052
households who were surveyed between October 1993 and July 1994.8 Much like the HRS,
oversampling of particular groups and exceptions to the age-eligibility screen influence the
composition of the sample, and the survey contains sample weights. (For further details, see
Soldo, Hurd, Rodgers, and Wallace 1997.)

6

3.1

Key Variables
Although the two data sources focus on different populations, pooling them is not

difficult because of substantial overlap in the questions that concern us. The combined sample
provides information on 13,654 households who answered a quite complete set of questions on
their financial circumstances. For our purposes, a critical question is “Do you [or your
(husband/wife/partner)] own part or all of a business?” If the respondent responds affirmatively,
he or she is classified as being a business owner.
The survey questions distinguish between two types of life insurance, term insurance and
whole insurance.9 Term insurance offers coverage during a specific time period, and it pays a
benefit only if the holder dies during the term. Premiums generally increase as one grows older.
Whole insurance usually has cash surrender value, meaning that one can cancel all or part of the
policy, and receive the cash value as a lump sum. Premiums for whole insurance are paid
periodically, and generally are constant over the policy’s duration. Whole life policies earn
annual dividends based on a variety of considerations, and income taxes on these dividends are
deferred. Term insurance generally does not have any cash surrender value.
Which type of insurance is more relevant in our context? A whole life policy is an
amalgam of insurance and a tax-preferred savings vehicle, while a term policy is more purely for
insurance. Hence, we believe that term insurance offers a cleaner measure of insurance demand,
and it will be our main focus.10 However, given that there is clearly an insurance component to
whole policies, we examine them as well.11
As noted earlier, a critical question is the extent to which liquid assets plus insurance
cover the expected estate tax liability. Our data ask about holdings of a variety of assets;
deciding which ones are “liquid” is not obvious because there is a continuum with respect to ease
of convertibility into cash. Rather than commit ourselves to a single definition, we use three:
7

1) checking accounts, savings accounts, and CDs; 2) the assets included in (1) plus stocks; and
3) the assets included in (2) plus bonds. We create the variable GAPi, which is the estimated
estate tax liability minus the value of assets in group i, provided that the difference is positive. If
the value is negative, then GAPi is equal to zero. The reason for the truncation is that, in effect,
GAPi represents the component of life insurance demand generated by the estate tax, and this
source of demand disappears when taxes are less than “liquid assets.”12
Because the proceeds from insurance policies are subject to the estate tax, the GAPi
variables are likely to be endogenous in any insurance demand equation. Hence, in all our
empirical work, we compute GAPi net of insurance. While solving the endogeneity problem, this
slightly complicates the interpretation of the parameter estimates. Specifically, a $1 increase in
insurance raises the gap by an amount equal to the individual’s marginal estate tax rate. This, in
turn, increases the amount of insurance to cover estate tax liability, with further repercussion on
both the size of the gap and insurance demand. Because the marginal tax rate is less than one,
the process converges. In Section 5 below, when we discuss the implications of our results, we
take this process into account.
Computation of the various GAPi variables requires an estimate of the respondent’s
expected estate tax liability, which is not asked in the survey. We construct a simple tax
calculator in which the taxable estate is computed as net worth (defined below) minus $600,000
for single respondents and $1,200,000 for married respondents.13 (These were the relevant
exemptions in 1992.) The tax liability is then found by applying the relevant rate schedule.
Marginal rates ranged from 37 percent to 55 percent, with the latter figure applying to the amount
of the taxable estate exceeding $3,400,000.14
This tax calculator is quite crude, but it is hard to know how great a handicap this creates.
As is well known, there are many ways to avoid estate tax. There are, for example, several
8

provisions that allow deferral of tax payments for closely held businesses and farms.15 Several
commentators argue that business owners aggressively exploit the various avoidance techniques:
“Most owners of small businesses and firms do not pay the estate tax” (Burman 1997, p. 675).
To the extent this portrayal is accurate, our estimates of the gap become less valid. However,
this view is not universally held. A number of stringent conditions must be met in order to
qualify for various breaks (see Joint Committee for Taxation 1998, pp. 4-5). Indeed, the Arthur
Anderson (1997) study argues that “A significant number are missing out on estate-planning and
tax-reduction opportunities, e.g., 43.4 percent do not routinely use the $10,000 annual gift
exclusion for their children.” As noted earlier, Poterba’s (1997, 1998) results support the notion
that many individuals fail to exploit opportunities to reduce estate taxes.
As a rough check on the accuracy of our tax calculator, we compared its predicted total
estate tax collections with actual estate tax receipts. Of course, the estate tax is collected only
when an individual dies, so we need an algorithm for predicting who will die. The AHEAD asks
respondents for the subjective probability that they will live at least another ten years. We
arbitrarily assumed that everyone whose answer was less than 10 percent would die within a year.
We then used our tax calculator to estimate the estate tax liability for these individuals and
computed the average estate tax per taxable estate (using the weights provided in the survey).
This yielded an average estate tax liability of $354,645, which is reasonably close to the actual
value of $385,706 (reported in Joulfaian 1998, Table 7). On this basis, we think that results
generated by a simple tax calculator provide useful information. Nevertheless, we discuss below
an alternative specification that allows for the possibility that the calculator produces substantial
errors for households with very high wealth.

9

3.2

A Preliminary Look at the Data
In our sample 10.7 percent of the respondents own businesses. (See Table 1 for means

and standard deviations of the variables.) Forty-nine percent of the entire sample owns term
insurance; the incidence is higher among business owners, 54.7 percent. Business owners are
also more likely to buy whole insurance; 51.9 percent versus 32.2 percent of the entire sample.
Business owners are not only more likely to buy insurance; conditional on purchase, they buy a
larger amount. The conditional mean of term insurance for business owners is $111,993. In the
sample as a whole, it is $47,854.
Might some of this insurance be “for” meeting estate tax liabilities? One way to start
answering this question is to see if there is, in fact, a gap between individuals’ estimated estate
tax liabilities and their liquid assets. The figures in Table 1 indicate that for the sample as a
whole, there is in fact such a gap: $12,190 on average using a narrow definition of liquid assets;
$8,649 including stocks; and $8,176 including bonds as well. For the sample of business owners,
the gaps are considerably higher: $76,590, $60,390, and $57,193, respectively, for the three
definitions of liquid assets.16 It might appear, then, that some of the business owners’ higher
demand for insurance is driven by a larger gap between liquid assets and estimated estate tax
liability. But extreme caution is required because, as Table 1 indicates, business owners differ in
other ways from the sample as a whole: they have higher net worth; higher income; and they are
less likely to be female and more likely to be married, among other things.17 Hence, a
multivariate approach is required when investigating the links between business ownership and
the demand for insurance.
Thus far we have focused on the overall demand for insurance. A distinct but related
question is whether the sum of insurance and liquid assets is enough to pay the estate tax
liability. We define a set of dichotomous variables COVERi, which take the value of one if the ith
10

concept of liquid assets is sufficient to cover the taxes, and zero otherwise. These variables are
defined only for those individuals with positive tax liabilities. As the mean values of the
COVERi variables in column (4) indicate, about 44 percent of the estates can pay estate taxes out
of insurance plus narrowly defined liquid assets; 63 percent including stocks in liquid assets; and
66 percent including bonds as well. The figures are somewhat lower for business owners: 41
percent, 54 percent, and 58 percent, respectively. Again, however, one must account for other
variables before concluding that business ownership independently affects the likelihood of
having the means to meet an estate tax bill.

4.

A Multivariate Framework

In this section we develop an empirical specification that allows us to investigate the
extent to which the demand for life insurance depends on the gap between liquid assets and estate
tax liability.18 As suggested above, to begin we must specify a set of variables other than the gap
that potentially can influence insurance demand.
The individual’s resources are likely to be important in this context—the greater one’s
assets, the easier it is to provide for one’s heirs without recourse to insurance, ceteris paribus.
Hence, we include the variable NETWORTH, defined as the sum of the net values of primary
residence, all other real estate, transportation vehicles, businesses, IRA/Keogh accounts,
stocks/mutual funds, checking/saving accounts, certificates of deposit, bonds, trust assets not
included in other categories, and miscellaneous assets, all less debts.19 Since we are trying to
explain holdings of insurance, we exclude the value of insurance from this calculation. Also, the
calculation excludes the asset value of pensions, because this figure is not available in our data.
In particular, 401(k) accounts and other such defined contribution instruments are not included.20
Pension income, however, is included in our measure of household income (see below). The
11

business value component of NETWORTH is ascertained by asking, “If you sold the business and
paid off any debts on it, how much would you get?” Thus, the figure relates to the market value
of the business, not the book value.
As is the case in most surveys of household wealth, respondents do not always provide a
value for one or more of their assets. The AHEAD and HRS surveys include a set of Acategorical
unfolding questions” to place nonresponses into bounded bracket values. The brackets bound the
value of the particular asset to a known interval.21 Specific values are then imputed by the survey
staff using a “hot deck” technique (see Smith 1995, 1997). Basically, in each data set a set of
economic and demographic covariates is used to match individuals within a bracket who did not
report a specific value to those who did.
A measure of the individual’s ability to pay for insurance is annual household income,
INCOME. An alternative would be to include a measure of permanent or lifetime income.
However, to do so requires a substantial number of assumptions and imputations (see, e.g.,
Auerbach and Kotlikoff 1987), so we employ the reported annual measure.
We include a dichotomous variable BUSINESS that equals one if the estate includes a
business. As noted earlier, business owners may face more uncertainty when it comes to estate
tax plans, which could affect their insurance demand, ceteris paribus. Also, business owners
might be more sophisticated financially than other individuals. The BUSINESS variable captures
these (and any remaining) differences.22
Several demographic variables might affect an individual’s demand for life insurance.
We have information on sex, marital status, number of living children, age, education and race.
The dichotomous variables FEMALE and MARRIED take on values of one if the individual is
female and married, respectively. AGE is the respondent’s age in years.23 One important reason
for including the AGE variable is that individuals may become more sensitive to estate tax issues
12

as they grow older, and re-arrange their financial affairs accordingly. In addition, life insurance
becomes more costly to individuals as they age, ceteris paribus. We augment the age variable
with a dichotomous variable, AHEAD, that takes a value of one if the observation is from the
AHEAD sample. Members of the HRS sample were born between 1931 and 1941; the AHEAD
sample was born in 1923 or earlier. Therefore, the AHEAD variable roughly differentiates those
born just prior to World War II and those born around World War I. Poterba and Samwick
[1997] have shown that there are substantial differences in asset ownership probabilities across
different birth cohorts; the presence of the AHEAD variable allows for the possibility that such
differences may be present in life insurance decisions as well.
EDUCATION and CHILDREN measure years of education and number of children,
respectively. With respect to race, the dichotomous variable BLACK is equal to one if the
individual is black, whites are the omitted group, and OTHRACE is the dichotomous variable for
individuals who are neither black nor white. The racial issue is of some interest in this context
because of claims that the estate tax hits black businesses particularly hard. A survey of the
largest black-owned businesses indicated that Aestate taxes make the continuation of the business
significantly more difficult or impossible. More than 80 percent said they do not have enough
assets to pay estate taxes” (Poole 1995, p. 3F).
An individual’s health status may affect both his desire for life insurance and its
availability. The data contain a self-reported measure of health status from which we create a set
of dichotomous variables: HLTHEXEL is one if health is excellent; HLTHVG is one if health is
very good; HLTHFAIR is one if health is fair; and HLTHPOOR if health if poor. (“Health is
good” is the omitted category.)
The previous section suggested that the demand for term insurance depends on the
variables just described as well as the gap between liquid assets and estate tax liability. The
13

response of insurance demand to the size of the gap is of particular interest in our context,
because it indicates whether there is a component of demand driven by estate tax considerations.
Our specification includes interactions that allow the effect of the gap to vary with AGE and with
BUSINESS. Further, we allow the effect of business ownership to vary with age. In computing
our estimates, the fact that 51 percent of the respondents do not have term insurance implies that
ordinary least squares is not an appropriate estimation technique. Instead, we employ a Tobit
estimator.

5.

Results

5.1

Basic Estimates
The parameter estimates are presented in Table 2. We discuss first our main concern—

the relationship among business ownership, the estate tax, and insurance demand. In terms of
our theoretical framework, the key issue is the extent to which people purchase life insurance to
fill the gap between expected estate tax liability and liquid assets. Recall, however, that there are
several ways in which liquid assets can be defined. Column (1) excludes stocks and bonds;
column (2) includes stocks; and column (3) includes bonds as well.
In column (1), the coefficients on the three variables involving GAP1 (the direct effect,
and interactions with AGE and BUSINESS) are jointly statistically significant at all conventional
levels—a test of the hypothesis that all the coefficients are zero yields a chi-squared statistic with
three degrees of freedom of 32.2. Thus, the gap between liquid assets and estate tax liability does
affect insurance demand, other things being the same. The interaction of GAP1 and AGE is
negative, implying that the older the individual, the smaller the impact of a given value of GAP1
upon insurance demand. The interaction of GAP1 and BUSINESS is also negative—a given gap
in the volume of liquid assets needed to meet the estate tax liability induces a smaller increase in
14

insurance demand for business owners than for other individuals, ceteris paribus. This is at odds
with the conjecture that business owners use insurance as the marginal source of funds to pay the
estate tax. Indeed, given that the probability of death increases with age, the fact that both these
interactions are negative runs counter to the notion that estate taxes are an important motivation
for life insurance.
Assessing the quantitative significance of GAP is slightly complicated by the fact that it
appears in several interactions. Evaluated at the mean age in the sample (65.5 years) and
assuming that the individual is not a business owner, a dollar increase in GAP1 increases the
Tobit index by about $0.043 (= 0.449 - 0.0062*65.5). To compute the change in expected
insurance demand, the Tobit coefficients must be transformed using the normal distribution 24,25
(see Maddala 1983, p. 159). This computation suggests that a $1 increase in GAP1 increases the
expected amount of term insurance by $0.027. The positive value is consistent with the theory
developed in Section 2. (See the discussion surrounding equation (9).) As already noted, for a
business owner the effect is less (because the interaction of GAP1 and BUSINESS is negative).
Conditional on BUSINESS being equal to one, a $1 increase in GAP1 leads to a $0.017 increase
in term insurance. In short, the data reveal a positive but very small marginal propensity to
purchase life insurance for estate tax reasons for non-business owners, and it is even smaller for
business owners.
This does not, of course, mean that owners of businesses demand less insurance than
other individuals, ceteris paribus. To investigate this issue, we must evaluate the impact of
BUSINESS and its various interactions upon insurance demand. The main effect of business
ownership is positive, but it decreases with age, and, as already noted, it decreases with the size
of the gap between liquid assets and estate tax liabilities. As before, to find the impact of owning
a business (i.e., changing BUSINESS from zero to one) upon expected insurance demand, we
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must use the appropriate Tobit transformation. This computation indicates that business owners
have $2,285 more insurance, ceteris paribus. Given that unconditional mean term insurance
holdings are only about $24,000 (see Table 1), this is a substantial amount.
Turning now to the other variables, we note that insurance demand decreases with net
worth and its square. (The linear and quadratic terms are jointly significant at the 0.03 level.)
This is consistent with Bernheim=s (1991) finding that the demand for term insurance falls with
lifetime resources. The coefficient on AGE is negative—within this age group, insurance
holdings fall with age, a result found in both the Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and Bernheim
(1991) studies. Married individuals carry more life insurance, and females less, while the
coefficients on the health variables suggest that the better an individual’s health, the more life
insurance he or she holds, ceteris paribus. Education and income are both positively related to
insurance demand. The coefficient on the dichotomous variable for blacks is negative, but small
in magnitude and statistically insignificant.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 2 include stocks and the sum of stocks and bonds,
respectively, in the computation of the gap between liquid assets and the estate tax. A glance at
these results suggests that sensible modifications in the way liquid assets are measured affect
neither the qualitative nor quantitative implications of our results. In particular, although the
positive main effects of GAP are larger in columns (2) and (3), so are the absolute values of the
negative coefficients on the interactions with age, leaving the net effect about the same.
Regardless of how the gap between estate taxes and liquid assets is measured, business owners
have more term insurance than other people, but do not respond to the gap as strongly as nonowners.
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5.2

Alternative Specifications
In this section we examine a variety of specifications to assess the robustness of our

results.
Whole Insurance.

As stated earlier, we view term life as the type of insurance that

makes most sense to analyze in the context of estate tax planning because there are alternative
incentives for purchasing whole insurance, such as the ability to save while deferring income
taxes. 26 That said, the existence of a type of policy called “survivor whole life insurance” blurs
this distinction. Such a policy covers a married couple, but the benefit is not paid until the
second person dies. In other words, a spouse cannot be the beneficiary of a survivorship whole
policy, making it inferior to standard whole policies for purposes of providing wealth to a
surviving spouse. However, the cost of a survivor whole life policy is lower than that of two
whole policies to cover both members of the couple, making it an economical way to provide the
means to pay estate taxes. Indeed, one company markets these as “estate saver policies.”
Unfortunately, our data do not differentiate between survivor whole life policies and
standard whole life policies. Because we do not know the relative importance of the former and
even conventional whole policies have an insurance component, we re-estimated our canonical
equations using the sum of term and whole policies as the dependent variable. The results are
reported in the first three columns of Table 3. To conserve space, we report only the coefficients
on BUSINESS, the GAP variables, and their various interactions. The results are quite similar to
those in Table 2. Hence, while there may be some conceptual ambiguity with respect to which
type of insurance is appropriate to analyze, as a practical matter, it does not make much
difference.
Tax Calculator.

As noted earlier, the accuracy of our simple estate tax calculator may

be affected by the existence of various tax avoidance schemes, although whether most
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individuals actually exploit such opportunities is unclear. To the extent various avoidance
techniques are employed, they are probably more prevalent at the upper end of the wealth
distribution. That is, if there is a problem with the tax calculator, it is likely to be affecting those
for whom our estimates of the various gaps are relatively large. To see whether large avoidance
incentives affect our results, we deleted the 5 percent of the sample with the highest (positive)
values of GAP, and re-estimated the canonical equations with the truncated sample.
The results are reported in columns (4), (5), and (6) of Table 3.27 The coefficients do not
differ very much from their counterparts in Table 2. This gives us some confidence that our
results are not an artifact of the crudeness of our estate tax calculator.
Uncertainties About Business Value.

In Section 4 we noted that some

respondents were unable to provide precise estimates of the values of various assets. In the case
of business assets, the majority of business owners provided a value, but about 35 percent either
refused to respond or were not sure of the value.28 As with other assets, the survey utilized
categorical unfolding questions as the basis for an imputation of business value. If an answer of
“not sure” reflects genuine uncertainty, it might have an independent effect upon insurance
demand—an individual who is unsure about the value of his business, and hence the associated
estate tax liability, may have a different demand than someone who is relatively certain, ceteris
paribus. We therefore augmented the basic specification with a dichotomous variable
NOTSURE, which takes a value of one if the imputation procedure was used and zero otherwise,
and interacted it with GAP and AGE. The results in columns (7) through (9) of Table 3 imply
that the overall impact of NOTSURE, taking account of all interactions, is modestly negative. To
the extent that NOTSURE reflects uncertainty about estate value, it suggests that such uncertainty
has little impact on insurance demand. We note, however, that this is not the only possible
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interpretation, because in some cases imputations were done simply because the respondent
refused to answer the question.
5.3

Probability that Liquid Assets and Insurance Cover Estate Tax Liability
So far our focus has been on the amount of life insurance that people purchase. A related

but distinct question is whether the sum of liquid assets and insurance covers the estate tax
liability. In particular, does the probability that business owners’ estates contain the liquid assets
and insurance needed to cover estate taxes differ from that of other individuals? To think about
this issue, recall from Table 1 the COVERi variables, which take the value of one if the individual
has enough insurance plus liquid assets (of type i) in the estate to cover estate taxes, and zero
otherwise. A natural strategy is to investigate whether the probability that COVERi is one differs
between business owners and the rest of the sample. Specifically, we use the sample of
individuals with positive estate tax liabilities to estimate regressions of COVERi on the right hand
side variables in our canonical model (without the GAP variables). Given that the COVERi
variables are dichotomous, we use a probit statistical model.
The results are reported in Table 4. They reveal a number of interesting tendencies. As
net worth increases, the likelihood that there are sufficient liquid assets and insurance to cover
estate tax liability falls. (The negative coefficient or the linear term dominates throughout 99
percent of the distribution of values for net worth.) Conditional on net worth, though, an
increase in income increases the probability. Being married increases the probability that one’s
estate will contain the resources needed to pay estate taxes, while the number of children and
years of education do not exert a statistically significant effect. Neither does being black, which
is noteworthy given the above cited concerns that blacks are particularly likely to be hurt by the
estate tax.
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Our main concern is the impact of business ownership on the probability of being able to
pay the estate tax. In all three specifications in Table 4, BUSINESS and its interaction with AGE
are individually insignificant. However, a test of BUSINESS and AGE*BUSINESS reveals they
are jointly significant in the specifications of columns (2) and (3).29 With respect to the
quantitative implications of the estimates, we first note that, evaluated at the mean value of AGE,
the impact is negative—the estates of business owners are less likely to be able to meet estate tax
liabilities than those of other people, ceteris paribus. As a qualitative matter, this result is not
surprising. After all, we know from Table 1 that business owners have larger gaps between
liquid assets and estate taxes. Further, as Table 2 indicates, even though business owners
purchase more insurance on average, their propensity to make additional purchases as the gap
grows is lower. The end result is that business owners are less likely to cover their estate tax
liabilities.
A possible problem with the estimates in Table 4 is that they ignore information with
respect to the amount by which liquid assets plus insurance fall short of estate tax liability. The
dichotomous left hand side variable treats as equivalent one estate in which the shortfall is a few
dollars and another in which it is thousands. We therefore estimate a continuous version of the
model, in which the left hand side variable is the difference between liquid assets plus insurance
and estate tax liability.30 The qualitative results are quite similar, and are not reported here to
conserve space.31 Hence, whether we view the ability to meet estate tax liabilities as a
dichotomous or continuous variable, the outcome is the same—the estates of business owners are
less likely to have the wherewithal to pay estate taxes.
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6.

Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the extent to which life insurance plays a role in dealing

with estate tax burdens, particularly for owners of possibly illiquid business assets. Our results
suggest that owners of businesses buy more insurance than other individuals, but even together
with the liquid assets in their portfolios, there is insufficient money to cover estate taxes. This
finding has several interpretations. One is that there are other means to cover estate taxes that do
not show up in our data. The heirs, for example, might have substantial liquid assets.32 A
second possibility is that, contrary to the popular view that keeping a business in the family is
very important to business owners, they make no special efforts in this respect. These results
complement other findings that, when it comes to estate tax issues, it is hard to explain behavior
using any simple model.
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1.

See Joint Committee on Taxation (1998). Indeed, Bernheim (1987) suggests that the tax
is actually a net revenue loser because of the interaction with the charitable deduction of
the individual income tax.

2.

Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and Bernheim (1991) estimate models of insurance
demand, but do not consider estate tax issues.

3.

As noted below, there are provisions that allow the estate tax payments on certain
businesses to be stretched out over a number of years. This would tend to reduce (but not
eliminate) such liquidation effects.

4.

It is not obvious that the second or third generations can run the business as well as the
original owner. For our purposes the key assumption is that the owner perceives that the
enterprise will be worth less if it is sold.

5.

If T < (L + I), then there are no cash flow constraints. Here we focus exclusively on
the case where T > (L + I). Our empirical work considers both regimes.

6.

The qualitative nature of our conclusions is unaffected by the actual pricing of
insurance. We make this assumption for expositional clarity alone.

7.

1RWHWKDWDV JURZVODUJHUWKHLPSDFWRIWKHJDSEHFRPHVJUHDWHU,QGHHGIRUODUJH
enough penalties for liquidating assets, insurance purchases rise more than dollar-fordollar with increases in the gap. That is
∂I
1
=
>1 .
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8.

In our statistical analysis we take into account the fact that the AHEAD data are from
a different year than the HRS data by allowing the intercepts to differ depending on
whether the observation is drawn from AHEAD or HRS.

9.

The survey question is, “Do you have any life insurance, including individual or
group policies?” The question clearly asks for life insurance from any source and it is
placed after the questions about assets, in which trusts are explicitly discussed.
Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the figure reported includes insurance held in
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trust.
10.

Another reason for focusing on term insurance relates to the fact that there is a minor
difference in the insurance questions in the two surveys. The AHEAD asks the value
of the policy if the holder dies, while HRS asks for the face value of the policy. Term
policies only have value when the policy holder expires, so the answer would be the
same in both surveys. With whole insurance, if the policy holder has borrowed
against the policy, the face value and the value at death could differ.

11.

Indeed, as noted below, certain types of whole life policies are specifically intended to
cover a couple’s estate tax liability.

12.

For information about the portfolio holdings of entrepreneurs, see Gentry and
Hubbard (1998).

13.

During the time period of our data (1992), if a member of a couple died, the survivor
could receive the entire estate tax free and transfer up to $600,000 of the estate to
children tax free. When the survivor died, the remaining estate was taxed normally
(i.e., using the $600,000 threshold). Therefore, a couple could shelter $1,200,000
from estate tax, leading to the $1,200,000 threshold for married respondents. For a
survey of estate and gift tax issues, see Joulfaian (1998).

14.

Beginning in 1998, up to $1.3 million of the value of family-owned business may be
excluded from the taxable estate.

15.

During our sample period, the tax for businesses (depending on their share in the gross
estate) could be deferred and paid over 14 years (plus nine months filing period). Four
percent interest was charged on the first million dollars of taxable estate, and interest
expenses were deductible in computing the estate tax. See Joulfaian (1998) for further
details. A related phenomenon is that businesses may be undervalued when they pass
through probate. To the extent this is true and recognized, owners will realize that the
estate tax burden will be less than that associated with the “true” value, which is reported
in the data.
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Note again that the GAPi variables do not include insurance.

17.

Such tendencies have been observed in other data; see, for example, Fairlie and
Meyer (1996).

18.

For alternative specifications with a somewhat less extensive set of regressors, see
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) or Bernheim (1991).

19.

Trust assets are included in both surveys. In the HRS, trusts are in a catch-all
category with “valuable collections and miscellaneous assets.” Therefore, we cannot
distinguish trusts from these other two categories. In AHEAD, the trust question is
asked at the end of the asset section. After determining if the respondent has a trust
and its value, the survey asks if the trust assets were already mentioned in the other
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asset questions. If the answer is yes, then the trust value is not added to net worth.
20.

To the extent that households with businesses accumulate a substantial amount of their
“retirement wealth” in the business, the omission of defined contribution pension plans
may bias our results. Specifically, our measure of the net worth of business owners may
be too high relative to the rest of the sample, leading to estimates of the various gaps that
are too high relative to the rest of the sample. In effect, then, owners of businesses might
appear to be buying too little life insurance (relative to the rest of the sample) to fill the
gap, ceteris paribus. To investigate this issue, we took advantage of the fact that the data
allow us to form a dichotomous variable for whether or not the individual has any kind of
pension. We interacted this variable both with the respective gap variables and the
dichotomous variable for business ownership. The interaction terms were insignificant,
lending some support to the notion that the omission of defined contribution assets does
not bias our estimates of how business ownership affects the demand for insurance.

21.

For example, if a respondent did not report an exact value, the interviewer asked if the
value was $50,000 or more. Based upon the answer, the respondent would be asked a
second question to narrow the categorical amount. The final amount categories for
business assets are $0-$9,999, $10,000-$49,999, $50,000-$499,999, and greater than
$500,000.

22.

Presumably, some types of businesses are more liquid, collaterializable or divisible than
others, but we have no information on the type of business.

23.

We experimented with a quadratic term in age, and found that it did not significantly
increase the explanatory power of the equation.

24.

We perform this calculation for each individual in the sample, and then report the
mean.

25.

As noted earlier, the purchase of insurance also affects the value of GAPi. Our
calculations incorporate this feedback. The feedback effects are very small. For
example, while the point estimate of the coefficient on the interaction between GAP1
and AGE is -0.006180, incorporating the feedback changes this to only -0.006178.

26.

The same distinction is made by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), who focus on the
demand for term insurance.

27.

Note that the sample sizes increase as we move from column (4) to column (6). As
the definition of liquid assets becomes more inclusive, the number of observations
with a positive value of GAPi decreases. Hence, 5 percent of that number decreases.
With fewer observations discarded, the number of observations used in the estimation
increases.

28.

Roughly 80 percent of respondents who did not report a value for their business
provided a categorical value, while the remaining respondents refused to provide a
categorical value. For those who provided no response at all, the imputation was
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based on the sample of those who provided bracket values.
29.

In column (1), the chi-square test statistic with two degrees of freedom is 3.89; in
column (2) it is 21.38; and in column (3) it is 17.74. The critical value at the 0.95
significance level is 5.99.

30.

Note the difference between this variable and the GAP variables that are on the right
hand side in the insurance demand equations of Table 3. The latter do not include
insurance in them, and hence can be treated as exogenous. In contrast, the variable
under consideration here does include insurance, and hence is endogenous.
Consistent with previous specifications, the variable is truncated below at zero.

31.

The only difference is that AGE and AGE x BUSINESS are jointly insignificant.

32.

Our data do not indicate whether or not children or other heirs own insurance policies on
the respondents’ lives.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics a

Entire Sample
(1)

Term Insurance
Holders
(2)

Business
Owners
(3)

Positive Estate
Tax
(4)

BUSINESS
(=1 if business owner)

0.107
(0.310)

0.119
(0.324)

1
(--)

0.538
(0.499)

TERM
(value of term insurance)

23,640
(73,338)

47,850
(98,630)

61,260
(152,300)

111,020
(250,075)

DTERM
(=1 if term insurance)

0.494
(0.500)

1
(--)

0.547
(0.498)

0.487
(0.500)

WHOLE
(value of whole insurance)

15,130
(63,690)

15,972
(63,100)

52,460
(140,800)

112,676
(252,697)

DWHOLE
(=1 if whole insurance)

0.322
(0.467)

0.331
(0.471)

0.519
(0.500)

0.558
(0.497)

WHOLE + TERM
(sum of whole and term)

38,770
(105,000)

63,820
(129,600)

113,700
(219,400)

223,696
(370,489)

0.687
(0.464)

1
(--)

0.815
(0.389)

0.782
(0.414)

GAP1 (difference between estate tax
liability and “liquid assets”)

12,190
(143,100)

12,470
(138,200)

76,590
(365,300)

324,495
(666,533)

GAP2
(“liquid assets” include stocks)

8,649
(115,700)

9,558
(121,000)

60,390
(299,700)

230,214
(553,183)

GAP3
(“liquid assets” include bonds)

8,176
(112,800)

8,942
(116,100)

57,193
(290,900)

217,639
(542,119)

COVER1b (=1 if estate tax liability can
be met by “liquid assets” plus insurance)

-----

0.544
(0.499)

0.409
(0.495)

0.437
(0.496)

COVER2b
(“liquid assets” includes stocks)

-----

0.688
(0.464)

0.540
(0.499)

0.630
(0.483)

COVER3b
(“liquid assets” includes bonds)

-----

0.721
(0.454)

0.576
(0.495)

0.663
(0.403)

194,900
(461,100)

207,400
(469,100)

624,500
(999,200)

1,797,755
(1,489,754)

NOTSURE (=1 if imputation was used
to estimate net worth)

0.0320
(0.176)

0.0320
(0.176)

0.298
(0.457)

0.214
(0.411)

INCOME
(household income)

37,380
(43,740)

44,530
(46,860)

73,007
(79,240)

117,315
(127,156)

Variable

D(WHOLE + TERM)
(=1 if whole or term insurance)

NETWORTH
(net worth)

Table 1. Continued a

Entire Sample
(1)

Term Insurance
Holders
(2)

Business
Owners
(3)

Positive Estate
Tax
(4)

FEMALE
(=1 if female)

0.553
(0.497)

0.510
(0.500)

0.395
(0.489)

0.376
(0.485)

MARRIED
(=1 if married)

0.555
(0.497)

0.662
(0.473)

0.821
(0.383)

0.691
(0.480)

AGE
(= age in years)

65.5
(12.0)

63.0
(11.1)

58.3
(8.63)

62.7
(10.5)

AHEAD (=1 if observation from the
AHEAD sample)

0.443
(0.497)

0.348
(0.476)

0.162
(0.369)

0.306
(0.461)

EDUCATION
(years of education)

11.5
(3.62)

12.0
(3.38)

13.3
(2.77)

14.4
(2.59)

BLACK
(=1 if black)

0.170
(0.376)

0.172
(0.377)

0.0688
(0.253)

0.0409
(0.198)

OTHRACE
(=1 if neither black nor white)

0.0969
(0.296)

0.0651
(0.247)

0.0620
(0.241)

0.0351
(0.184)

CHILDREN
(= number of children)

2.98
(2.22)

3.06
(2.14)

3.10
(2.00)

2.69
(2.07)

HLTHEXEL
(=1 if health is excellent)

0.168
(0.374)

0.192
(0.394)

0.301
(0.459)

0.333
(0.472)

HLTHVG
(=1 if health is very good)

0.253
(0.435)

0.275
(0.446)

0.316
(0.465)

0.353
(0.478)

HLTHFAIR
(=1 if health is fair)

0.184
(0.388)

0.163
(0.369)

0.104
(0.305)

0.0858
(0.280)

HLTHPOOR
(=1 if health is poor)

0.106
(0.307)

0.0786
(0.269)

0.0320
(0.176)

0.0234
(0.151)

Observations

13,654

6,746

1,467

513

Variable

a

Figures in cells are means; those in parentheses are standard deviaitons. Computations based on combined HRSAHEAD sample.
b
In column (2), based only on 250 observations that also have positive estate tax liability. In column (3), based
only on 276 observations that also have positive estate tax liability.

Table 2. Demand for Term Insurance a
Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.4492
(0.07938)

0.5507
(0.1057)

0.6301
(0.1127)

-0.001515
(0.004843)

-0.0003044
(0.004766)

-0.0006949
(0.004756)

-2.85
(1.34)

-3.00
(1.27)

-3.07
(1.21)

BUSINESS

108,600
(22,040)

109,700
(22,058)

109,200
(22,045)

AGE

-1,330
(185.0)

-1,333
(185.0)

-1,335
(184.9)

GAPi xAGE

-0.006180
(0.001161)

-0.007895
(0.001677)

-0.009091
(0.001810)

GAPi xBUSINESS

-0.05674
(0.01890)

-0.05475
(0.02274)

-0.05830
(0.02303)

CHILDREN

-51.16
(467.1)

-62.62
(467.1)

-68.31
(466.9)

MARRIED

-25,950
(2,365)

-25,820
(2,362)

-25,801
(2,361)

FEMALE

-9,050
(2,145)

-8,969
(2,145)

-8,917
(2,144)

AHEAD

-9,311
(4,243)

-9,386
(4,245)

-9,268
(4,244)

HLTHEXCEL

13,160
(3,009)

13,100
(3,009)

13,060
(3,007)

HLTHVG

5,331
(2,659)

5,306
(2,660)

5,372
(2,659)

HLTHFAIR

-4,378
(3,011)

-4,372
(3,013)

-4,365
(3,011)

HLTHPOOR

-8,552
(3,781)

-8,641
(3,783)

-8,602
(3,781)

EDUCATION

1,837
(336.6)

1,827
(336.7)

1,830
(336.5)

0.6199
(0.02691)

0.6233
(0.02680)

0.6263
(0.02682)

GAPi

b

NETWORTH
NETWORTH2 (x10-9)

INCOME

Table 2. Continued a
Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

BUSINESSxAGE

-1,800
(377.6)

-1,828
(377.9)

-1,820
(377.7)

BLACK

-1,623
(2,784)

-1,520
(2,785)

-1,537
(2,783)

OTHRACE

-27,360
(3,780)

-27,320
(3,782)

-27,283
(3,780)

CONSTANT

12,310
(12,630)

12,507
(12,629)

12,480
(12,620)

Log likelihood

-90,834

-90,836

-90,832

Observations

13,654

13,654

13,654

a

Left hand side variable is the value of term insurance. Estimation by Tobit. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Variables are defined in Table 1.
b
In column (1), GAPi excludes stocks and bonds from the computation of liquid assets. Column (2)
includes stocks, and Column (3) includes stocks and bonds.

Table 3. Demand for Insurance: Alternative Specifications a

Variable

Include Whole Insurance
(1)
(2)
(3)

Delete Returns with Highest Tax
(4)
(5)
(6)

Include NOTSURE Variable
(7)
(8)
(9)

GAPi b

0.1526
(0.05355)

0.3690
(0.0884)

0.4374
(0.09305)

0.4075
(0.09405)

0.6866
(0.1469)

0.7715
(0.1585)

0.4863
(0.08012)

0.6300
(0.1090)

0.6980
(0.1152)

BUSINESS

156,500
(22,670)

151,200
(22,710)

149,300
(22,700)

107,831
(21,990)

106,400
(22,050)

106,400
(22,037)

137,000
(27,370)

138,400
(27,390)

138,300
(27,370)

GAPi *AGE

-0.002620
(0.0008085)

-0.006290
(0.001439)

-0.007230
(0.00152)

-0.005864
(0.001401)

-0.01039
(0.002477)

-0.01179
(0.002704)

-0.006736
(0.001171)

-0.009153
(0.001746)

-0.01020
(0.001868)

GAPi *BUSINESS

0.03397
(0.01892)

0.007685
(0.02481)

0.006756
(0.02482)

-0.03680
(0.02432)

0.03742
(0.02714)

-0.04194
(0.02764)

-0.02952
(0.02005)

-0.02559
(0.02495)

-0.02999
(0.02526)

BUSINESS*AGE

-2.308
(384.6)

-2.201
(385.0)

-2,165
(384.8)

-1,780
(375.3)

-1,757
(377.7)

-1,756
(377.6)

-2,205
(475.4)

-2,212
(475.7)

-2,224
(475.4)

NOTSURE

--

--

--

--

--

--

-105,800
(44,102)

-107,000
(44,214)

-110,000
(44,203)

GAPi *NOTSURE

--

--

--

--

--

--

-0.07587
(0.01941)

-0.07406
(0.02130)

-0.07074
(0.02214)

AGE*NOTSURE

--

--

--

--

--

--

1,467
(47.5)

1,451
(49.4)

1,492
(749.3)

-118,990

-118,989

-118,986

-90,657

-90,748

-90,746

-90,816

-90,820

-90,815

13,654

13,654

13,654

13,637

13,642

13,643

13,654

13,654

13,654

Log Likelihood
Observations
a

In Columns (1) through (3), the dependent variable is the sum of whole and term insurance. In columns (4) through (6), the dependent variable is the value of
term insurance (as in Table 2), but the 5 percent of the sample with the highest values of GAP is deleted. In columns (7) through (9), the dependent variable is the
value of term insurance and NOTSURE is included in the specification. All equations are estimated using Tobit and all equations include the same additional righthand-side variables listed in Table 2. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
b
GAPi = GAP1 in columns (1), (4), and (7); GAP2 in columns (2), (5), and (8); and GAP3 in columns (3), (6), and (9).

Table 4. Probability that Insurance Plus Liquid
Assets Covers Estate Taxes a
Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

NETWORTH(x10 )

-1.88
(0.329)

-1.01
(0.131)

-0.944
(0.123)

NETWORTH2 (x10-14)

11.9
(1.96)

5.90
(1.16)

5.48
(1.12)

BUSINESS

-1.175
(0.8422)

-0.8865
(0.8496)

-0.5165
(0.8648)

AGE

-0.01217
(0.01570)

0.001415
(0.01546)

-0.003322
(0.01556)

CHILDREN

-0.01335
(0.03628)

-0.01950
(0.03817)

-0.03604
(0.03799)

MARRIED

1.174
(0.2430)

0.8603
(0.1768)

0.8354
(0.1754)

FEMALE

-0.3457
(0.1368)

-0.3941
(0.1403)

-0.3716
(0.1442)

AHEAD

-0.1595
(0.3138)

0.1366
(0.3070)

0.3675
(0.3081)

HLTHEXCE

0.06616
(0.1901)

0.04299
(0.1856)

-0.01586
(0.1874)

HLTHVG

0.06335
(0.1799)

0.08767
(0.1768)

-0.01931
(0.1774)

HLTHFAIR

0.2144
(0.2829)

-0.1356
(0.2597)

-0.2402
(0.2585)

HLTHPOOR

0.1831
(0.4255)

0.3189
(0.5929)

0.0922
(0.5615)

EDUCATION

0.05502
(0.02852)

0.04712
(0.02921)

0.04398
(0.02888)

2.97
(0.939)

2.34
(0.631)

2.04
(0.597)

BUSINESSxAGE

0.01489
(0.01319)

0.003724
(0.01333)

-0.001336
(0.01356)

BLACK

-0.4235
(0.3300)

0.05202
(0.3508)

-0.07636
(0.3423)

-6

INCOME(x10-6)

Table 4. Continued a
Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

OTHRACE

-0.3210
(0.3768)

-0.5963
(0.3522)

-0.7178
(0.3463)

CONSTANT

1.565
(1.073)

0.8088
(1.089)

1.218
(1.094)

Log likelihood

-233.8

-253.8

-248.5

513

513

513

Observations
a

The left hand side variable is a one if the sum of insurance (term plus whole) and “liquid
assets” exceeds estate tax liability. Estimation is done with probit and figures in parentheses are
robust standard errors. Variables are defined in Table 1.
b
In column (1), GAPi excludes stocks and bonds from the computation of liquid assets.
Column (2) includes stocks, and Column (3) includes stocks and bonds.
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